题目：网络上的演化博弈
报告人：苏奇
地点：2号学院楼2202-2203
时间：2023年11月23日15:30
报告人简介
苏奇，上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院副教授，上海浦江人才。分别于华中科技大学、北京大学取得学士、博士学位。曾在美国波士顿大学开展博士学位联合培养，哈佛大学进行学术访问。曾获得美国西蒙斯基金会为期三年的独立经费资助，在宾夕法尼亚大学数学系和生物系从事学术研究。主要研究兴趣为网络科学、群体决策和博弈理论等。在PNAS、Nature Human Behaviour、 Nature Computational Science、Science Advances等期刊上发表研究论文20余篇。多项成果被国家基金委员会、中国教育网、宾夕法尼亚大学、北京大学、上海交通大学官网报道。获得西蒙斯博士后学者奖，中国控制与决策会议张嗣瀛奖，全国大数据与社会计算会议新星奖等。担任匈牙利基金会评审人以及四个学术期刊副编辑/客座编辑。
报告摘要
Collective intelligence, which emphasizes that systems can rely on cooperation and coordination among individuals to achieve goals that are impossible by any individual alone to achieve, proves to be an increasingly promising research direction in artificial intelligence. In collective intelligence, one of the most cutting-edge questions is how and when cooperation and coordination emerge, especially when individuals have the cognitive ability to make their own behavioral decisions and simultaneously face conflicts between their own and collective interests. Classic game theory based on the assumption of perfect rationality has predicted a convergence towards the Nash Equilibrium state, i.e., the collapse of cooperation. In this talk, I give a brief overview of studies about system structures’ effects on the evolution of cooperation. Besides, I present two works about the evolutionary games on complex networks, which respectively accounts for the coupling of multiple systems and the time varying features of system structures. We derive rigorous analytical conditions to predict when a system evolves away from the Nash Equilibrium and reveal that the coupling of multiple systems and dynamic networks can promote the evolution of cooperation by orders of magnitude.